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POWER OF A STATE TO TAX INTANGIBLES OF A
FOREIGN CORPORATION
It is a well-gettled proposition that one state may not constitutionally levy a tax upon property in another, this being -held to be

a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' In the case of tangible property the rule is not particularly
difficult to apply, but in the ease of intangibles, choses in action,
which, in the very nature of things, cannot be physically located in
any particular place, how can a state be accused of levying an unconstitutional tax upon property in another state When it levies
the tax upon intangibles belonging to any person in any state ?2
'Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 S. Ct. 36
(1905); United States v. Bennett, 232 U. S. 299, 34 S. Ct. 433 (1913); Frick
v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603 (1924).
2 But see Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59
(1929), 67 A. L. R. 386 (1930); Farners' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280
U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98, 65 A. L. R. 1000 (1930) ; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.
S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436 (1930), 72 A. L. R. 1303 (1931) ; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. 1, 51 S. Ct. 54 (1930); First National Bank
of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174, 77 A. L. R. 1401 (1932);
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The maxim mobilia sequu'ntur personam
is generally applied to
give to intangibles a fictitious situs for purposes of taxation, i. e.,
the domicil of the owner. It is readily apparent that if this were an
ironclad rule very undesirable results would be reached in many
cases by its application. A corporation not infrequently carries
on the greater part of its business in states other than that in which
it is domiciled, and where a business is carried on in such a state,
receiving all the benefits of government from that state, it would
seem most unreasonable to hold that it should be excused from contributing its just share to the expense of maintaining that government simply by reason of the fact that some other state had created
that corporation.
The efforts to avoid such a pernicious result led to the formulation of the "business situs" doctrine, usually stated, in effect,
that intangibles may acquire a situs for purposes of taxation at a
place other than the domicil of the owner where they have become
an integral part of a local business. The earliest case on the point4
seems to rest not so much on the theory that the intangibles were
part of a local business but that notes, tangible evidences of the
obligations, were within the taxing state. As might have been
expected, this was repudiated in short order,3 but even after it had
been held that it was unnecessary that evidences of the obligations
be within the taxing state, we find the Court, in State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National D'Escomptec endeavoring to sustain
a tax upon intangibles on the basis of this outmoded idea. Subsequent cases, however, seem to have crystallized the exception in its
present form."
The recent Supreme Court case of Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Fox,$ affirming the judgment of the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals,9 presents an interesting aspect of the problem. In that

Lowndes, Passing of Situs - Jurisdiction to Tax Shares of Corporate Stook
(1932) 45 HaV. L. RBv. 777.
3Generally loosely translated "moveables follow the person".
dNew Orleans v. Stemple, 175 U. S. 309, 20 S. Ct. 110 (1899).
Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S.133, 20 S.Ct. 585 (1900).
a 191 U. S. 388, 24 S. Ct. 109 (1903).
7 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 205 U. S.395, 27 S.Ct.
499 (1907); Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 27 S.Ct. 712 (1907); Liverpool &
London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U. S.346, 31 S.Ct. 550,
L. R. A. 1915C 903 (1911); Orient Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U.
S. 358, 31 S. Ct. 554 (1911).
8 298 U. S.193, 56 S.Ct. 773 (1935).
9Be Wheeling Steel Corp. Assessment, 115 W. Va. 553, 177 S. E. 535
(1934), 104 A. L. R.802 (1936).
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case a corporation created under the laws of Delaware maintained
its "business offices" in West Virginia, having only such nominal
offices in Delaware as were necessary for it to keep its corporate
franchise. The corporation owned certain intangibles, consisting
for the most part of debts owed by debtors who were not domiciled
in either Delaware or West Virginia. The West Virginia court held
that these intangibles were taxable under the local statute.10 The
Supreme Court held that the West Virginia statutes were constitutional, not violating the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment, because these intangibles had become integral parts of a local business thereby acquiring a situs
for taxation other than at the domicil of their owner.1
The Wheeling Steel case seems to carry the doctrine of business situs further than any case decided heretofore. This is best
illustrated by reference to a very illuninating article on the subject by Powell.
"In all the Supreme Court cases in which the doctrine of
business situs has been applied, the taxing state has been the
domicil of the debtors as well as the place where the business
was conducted .... there is not a little reason to suspect that
the court might not discover a business situs unless the domicil
of the debtor as well as the conduct of business is within the
taxing jurisdiction.
"The basis for this suspicion is the emphasis placed by Mr.
Justice Hughes in Liverpool etc. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors[ 12] on the fact that the taxing state was the domicil of the
debtor. ' 3
It is to be noted that in the Wheeling Steel case, in which the
opinion was written by the same eminent jurist who placed so much
emphasis on the fact that debtor was domiciled in the taxing state
in the Liverpool Insurance Company case, the greater part of the
debtors were domiciled in states other than the taxing state, although the opinion makes no note of this fact.
Hence it would seem that the only element necessary to give a
state jurisdiction to tax intangibles is that the business of which the
intangibles are a part be carried on in the taxing state. It is sub10 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 11, art. 3, § 12, as amended by W. Va. Acts
1933, e. 38; c. 11, art. 3, § 13.
11 Petition for a rehearing denied, 57 S. Ct. 4 (1936).
12221 U. S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 550 (1911).
13 Powell, Business Situs of Credits (1921) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 89, 104.
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mitted that such a result is sound. As is pointed out by Powell14
the real criterion as to whether a state may tax the intangibles of a
nonresident corporation is fairness. Is it fair for the particular
state to tax the assets of the particular business? If this question
be answered affirmatively the intangibles are said to have a business situs in the state. In other words, the conception of business
situs affords a convenient method of explaining a result which the
court has already reached but is not a reason for reaching the result."5 It is perhaps most aptly described as "a tag for a result.' "'
If this be true is there any necessity for maintaining a gossamer
barricade of pseudo-requirements for the operation of the doctrine?
The idea that tangible evidences of indebtedness must be present in
the taxing state has been discarded, and in the Wheeling Steel case 7
the Court has apparently relegated to the judicial attic the theory
that the debtor must be domiciled in the taxing state. It seems,
therefore, that the Supreme Court has reduced the doctrine of business situs to its lowest common denominator, i. e., there must be a
business carried on in the state, and it must be fair for the state to
tax that business.
H. A. W.
14 Id. at 108.
15 Cf. Lowndes, supra n.2, at 777, where business situs was termed "the legal
trumpery with which the court embroiders its opinions in order to give a
delusive inevitability to its conclusions."
18 Powell, supra n. 13, at 90.
17 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 56 S. Ct. 773 (1935).
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